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SiGNiNG DiSSENT iN THE NAME OF “WOMAN”: 
REFLECTiONS ON FEMALE ACTiViST COALiTiONS
iN iSTANBuL, TuRKEY
ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the unexpected female coalition created in 2008 between 
feminist, LBT (lesbian, bisexual, transsexual) and religious activists in Turkey, and 
asks how women come to signify –and possibly challenge– the pre-established 
demarcations of politics framing gendered precariousness. How do women claim 
to sign differently the contract of the political? By referring to the neoliberal 
and conservative values of the current government’s agenda and underlying the 
importance of newly formed alliances between activist women, it explores the 
complex ways in which these three groups struggle to be heard within public debate 
in Turkish society and how they try to form alliances despite their differences. 
Keywords: gender, activism, coalitions, precarity
Fewer than twenty religious activist women had gathered beneath Cum-
huriyet Anıtı, the Republic Monument, which stands at the centre of Tak-
sim Square in istanbul. in a soft and thin voice, one of them was reading 
a press release. There was a calm tension in the air. With serious and sad 
faces, the protesters were holding A4 papers featuring the names of women 
who had been subjected to discrimination because they bore religious sym-
bols upon their bodies. The emblematic statue of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
in the background was a stark contrast to the protesters’ claims to be re-
membered as citizens with rights and as women who have suffered in a 
secular polity. 
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However, if this scene were to be viewed only as the claim of religious 
women to safeguard their right to be re-emplaced in the secular polity, this 
would devalue the political message of that day. in light of growing ten-
sions between the government and the oppositional party over the use of 
headscarves in public institutions, the religious activists declared in their 
press release that decisions were being taken in their name without giving 
them space to be heard, without considering them as equal interlocutors 
regarding matters that affect their underprivileged and vulnerable position 
in society. More significantly, however, the poster laid out on the street, 
featuring the slogan “Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz” (“we keep an eye on 
each other”, or “we look after each other”), was representing a women’s 
activist platform formed in 2008. “A public sphere where we cannot walk 
arm in arm is not our public sphere”, read the headline of the petition 
signed by women of different ideological and political aspirations, such as 
feminists and LBT activists, to inaugurate this activist women’s coalition. 
The feminists and lesbians who were present on that day were supporting 
the religious activists’ claims for rights by declaring that they were aware 
of how hostile “home” can be for them as well.
My aim in this paper is to explain how the common political struggle 
of different activist women reverberated that day as a call to challenge 
common sense. in other words, this protest not only invites us to think 
again what is at stake in a demonstration organised by religious activist 
women who protest their position in Turkish society. Rather, it also brings 
forth the complexity of the issues raised when different female activists at-
tempt to challenge the entrenchment of inner national borders set between 
them, by supporting each other despite their differences. in what follows, 
i will focus first on the government’s attempt to amend the constitution in 
order to secure religious women’s rights, and explain the reasons why this 
led to strong reactions by some religious activists, while also igniting an 
interest in creating unexpected alliances, bringing them for the first time 
together to sign the name of ‘woman’ as a means of defining a common act 
of dissidence. Veena Das insightfully argues that a signature can be seen 
as a “writing technology of the state” to assign citizenship status to its 
members while also defining who is to be seen as vulnerable (2007:163). 
However, in this case, as i will argue: “the iterability of utterances and 
actions in which the signature of the state can detach itself from its origin 
and be crafted onto other structures and other chains of significations” 
(Das, 2007:177) becomes part of a gendered struggle to claim the name of 
‘woman’ as a politically intelligible signature of dissent.
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1. HOSTiNG POLiTiCS iN THE NAME OF “WOMAN”
in 2008, the so-called “headscarf controversy” was once again over-
determining the polarisation of public affects and debates in Turkey. The 
governing Justice and Development Party (AKP), following an unexpected 
decision taken by the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, attempted 
to pass a constitutional amendment in order to secure the lifting of the 
headscarf ban in higher education and the public sector.1 The secular/
Kemalist political establishment, despite having lost governmental power 
in 2002, had preserved its hegemony over several milieus of the state, 
especially high judiciary and administrative boards like the Constitutional 
Court and the Higher Education Council (YÖK).2 it was not unexpected, 
then, that the major opposition party, CHP (Republican People’s Party), 
while performing its role as the doorkeeper of Republican values and 
acting in the name of a secular state imbued with a militarist/Kemalist 
ideology, demanded the intervention of the Constitutional Court, which 
annulled the amendments by nine votes to two in June 2008. The Court 
further opened a case in which, for the first time, a governing party with 
a large parliamentary majority came under threat of closure, as 71 party 
officials, among them the President and the Prime Minister, could have 
been banned for five years from political activities. 
The staging of an almost theatrical moment, in which those represent-
ing the islamic political establishment were positioned before the law of 
the Constitutional Court and the polity’s secular values, was not something 
new.3 However, this time, this political gesture became even more signifi-
1. The suggested amendment was targeting constitutional Articles 10 and 42. Article 10, 
which guarantees equality before the law, would change to secure equal access for all citizens 
to all public services, and Article 42, which certifies the right to education, would include a 
phrase aiming to prevent the denial of access to education. in addition to these amendments the 
AKP government, following the suggestion of the minor opposition Nationalist Movement Party 
(MHP), proposed the amendment of Article 17 of the Higher Education Council regulations, 
which governs the style of clothing in universities. Regarding these changes see also Saktanber 
and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008.
2. The Higher Education Council is a body made up of members selected by the president 
of Turkey, the Council of Ministers, Ministry of Education, the inter-university Council and 
even the military. in the 1980s when it was founded, it was used as a mechanism to implement 
the regulations introduced by the Ministry of Education against veiling practices and therefore 
enacted orders banning students, firing university staff and safeguarding by all means the of-
ficial state ideology.
3. The role of the Constitutional Court is of great interest because since 1982 it has shut 
down more than 18 parties, most of them pro-islamic or pro-Kurdish, on accusations of breach-
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cant than in the past, as AKP had since attained unprecedented popularity 
across various strata of Turkish society4 and this underpinned Erdoğan’s 
assertive tone in defending his attempt to amend the constitution.
During that period an executive member of an islamic NGO called AK-
DER (Ayrımcılığa Karşı Kadın Hakları Derneği – Organisation for Wom-
en’s Rights Against Discrimination) noted in one of our discussions:
The parties are creating a bigger problem for us. it is a dead end. if the 
Constitutional Court decides to reject the legislative changes, it will be a 
problem. if they don’t reject it, it is still a problem. The articles that AKP 
tried to amend were not a problem for us. in Turkey, there is no law that ex-
plicitly prohibits the use of the headscarf. The problem is created because 
the ban on the headscarf can be enforced if perceived as a threat to laws 
protecting secularism. it is a matter of interpretation. And what the parties 
managed to do once again is to turn people against us.
This statement was highlighting the reasons why AK-DER had decid-
ed to oppose AKP’s decision to amend the constitution and had launched 
a signature campaign that was later warmly embraced by feminist and 
LBT activists, leading to the formation of the women’s activist platform 
“Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz”. How can we interpret the political stance 
of these religious activist women?
Ayşe Kadıoğlu has argued that, through the accommodation of an ‘anti-
political’ discourse that refuses to be related to particular political groups 
and is more concerned with influencing public consciousness, islamic or-
ganisations, like AK-DER, manage to decipher the relation between civil 
society, islam and democracy through the use of a rights language which 
foregrounds “the conception of an alternative view of politics that is more 
ing democracy’s principles as defined by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. During the 1990s the Con-
stitutional Court had reached the decision to dissolve the Refah Party (Welfare Party) on the 
grounds of representing political islam, after the party’s unsuccessful proposal to the Parliament 
to amend the principle of secularism (for an analysis of the Refah Party’s politics see Arat, 
2005). Additionally, in 1998 when Erdoğan was mayor of istanbul and considered a prominent 
candidate to be the next leader of the banned Refah Party, he was convicted with a 10-month 
prison sentence for inciting religious and ethnic hatred, after reading a poem with strong reli-
gious connotations during a meeting in Siirt. For an insightful analysis of the role of the Consti-
tutional Court see Kogacioglu, 2004.
4. For example, Cıhan Tuğal’s (2009) ethnographic research on Sultanbeyli in the early 
2000s demonstrates how AKP managed to moderate the revolutionary potential of islamist poli-
tics because the language of neoliberal economic policies started to make more sense both to the 
religious working class and to some secularist elites.
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radical since it is above and beyond political society” (2005:37). There-
fore, what the author defines as anti-politics is an anti-state rhetoric, a 
strategically incorporated depoliticisation of identities, which nevertheless 
remains, above all, a politicised discourse. However, in this case, when 
AK-DER prepared a signature campaign as a means of answering back both 
to the political parties and to those who constantly perceived veiled wom-
en’s politics with suspicion, their aim was to make explicit that as women 
wearing the headscarf they were similarly aware of other political prob-
lems. in their press release, they contested the state’s authority over their 
bodies; they asked for freedom in universities for everybody who had been 
expelled on the basis of their religious, political, ethnic or other beliefs, 
and they condemned the implementation of Article 301 of the Constitution 
restricting freedom of speech. Within one day, immediately after this peti-
tion was circulated on the web, it had gained more than 650 signatures of 
religious women. This also ignited the warm embrace of feminist and LBT 
activists who then decided to collectively sign a different statement in sup-
port of the veiled activists’ initiative. 
in the meantime, on 30 July 2008, the Constitutional Court announced 
its decision not to close down AKP, with six of eleven votes nonetheless 
supporting closure: seven would have been enough to disband it. Ten of 
eleven judges found the party guilty of supporting anti-secular activities 
and issued a serious warning along with a penalty of state funding cuts. 
The decision satisfied the European union and Erdoğan made declarations 
of triumph. What was apparently celebrated, though, was not the success in 
securing religious women’s rights since the ban was not lifted. Moreover, 
the “headscarf controversy”, without being resolved, once again ended in 
a “deadlock”, dividing society into two separate camps and awakening 
uncertainty, fear and suspicion (Saktanber and Çorbacıoğlu, 2008: 515-6). 
The name of “woman” here, or acting in the name of women’s rights, 
appeared more to stand as a metaphor for sustaining a persistent fight be-
tween the supposedly incommensurable secular and religious worldviews, 
marking them as a constant threat to each other’s limits (cf. Mahmood, 
2009:64).5 The political language used in such “patriarchal bargains”, to 
quote Deniz Kandiyoti’s (1988) insightful term, renders sexual difference 
affirmed and legitimised as a bargain over the stability and the unity of 
the city while the division between “Kemalist” and “islamic” worldviews 
5. For a critical analysis of the limits set by secular and religious affects and symbols see 
Navaro-Yashin, 2002; Asad, 2003; Mahmood 2005; Asad, Brown et al., 2009.
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aims to become commonsensical in a polity consuming the politics of such 
aesthetics, lifestyles and visions. ultimately, the possibility of women 
voicing their demands in their own terms is foreclosed because, under 
such demarcations of the political field, female religious precariousness is 
turned into a frame able to produce either vulnerable subjects in need of 
protection or dangerous subjectivities threatening the polity’s limits (cf. 
Spivak, 1988; Abu-Lughod, 2002). For this reason, i suggest, one needs 
to push further the possible connotations of the anti-political politics of 
the female religious activists in order to understand the (im)possibility of 
articulating a different political voice “through the ‘ocean of discourses’, 
which are exclusively male discourses” (Varikas, 2010: 240). Consequent-
ly, when Kadıoğlu argues that the female religious activists’ politics are 
anti-political, this is clearly not Loraux’s “antipolitical” that i perceive to 
haunt the field of answerability, that is, the ability to answer back in a voice 
that will not reaffirm the language one tries to contest. For Eleni Varikas, 
who follows Nicole Loraux, tracing women’s voices amongst this “ocean 
of discourses” is an “impossible task” (ibid.). Or, in Loraux’s words, the 
antipolitical that is against politics becomes “the other of politics, but also 
another politics, no longer based on consensus and living together, but on 
what i call the ‘bond of division’” (2002:23, cited in Athanasiou and Tzel-
epis, 2010:111). ultimately, the female religious activists are ensnared in 
this “impossible task”, as i will argue. 
Following Giorgio Agamben’s insight that it is not only people who are 
assigned with a signature, but also concepts that have signatures (2009:76), 
what would it mean if ‘woman’ was to be seen as a concept that bears its 
own signature? How can we understand what a signature signifies when it 
bears the name of (real) women, or when for the female activists “woman” 
appears as a signature, namely, as a testimony of a common act of dissent?
2. SiGNiNG THE NAME OF “WOMAN”
The press release inaugurating this activist women’s platform read: 
We, women, both believers and non-believers, veiled or not-veiled, women 
who act within the frame of women’s rights and liberties, we are against 
those saying that ‘if you exist, then i do not.’ 
We oppose the racist subjection of veiled women, via being considered 
as “islamic robots” by such adjectives as ignorant, bigoted, mischievous, 
disingenuous, opportunist. We oppose the sexist consideration of not-
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veiled women as if they are sexual commodities, exhibitionists, seducers. 
We know that the oppression and exploitation of women are facilitated by 
the gaps created among them. And we think that the suppression of women 
can be overcome only in an environment of peace and by the practice of 
rights and liberties. We, women, who are against all kinds of discrimination 
and injustice, reject all types of prohibitions and oppressions by the state as 
a “field of contest for brave men”, which ignores our existence by relying 
on the understanding that “the place of woman is by her husband’s foot”, 
which makes discrimination through the regulations on “public morality”, 
which aims to delimit women’s liberties. We, the women, reject the control 
over our bodies in the name of modernism, secularism, the republic, reli-
gion, tradition, custom, morality, honour or freedom. 
“ignoring anyone directs him/her to be suspicious about his/her own 
existence.” Hannah Arendt.
We, women, are not suspicious of each other, but we look after each 
other! Because we, women, stay together with those whom we recognise!
By appropriating the connotations of the verb sahip çıkmak (to step 
forth as the owner of), the activists were performatively re-inscribing 
within the national political economy the meaning of ‘stepping forth as 
women’ in order to take care of each other (Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz). 
They were positioning themselves as the hosts of the home’s rules while 
objecting, refusing and opposing the sexist representations of women in 
society by the state or by their reiteration in ideologies aiming to control 
women’s bodies. 
At the same time, the invocation of Hannah Arendt in the context of the 
text works to make “woman” echo in the name of humanity, a humanity 
that for Arendt welcomes the public sphere as a space of rights grounded 
upon “the ungrounded right to have rights” (cf. Arendt, 2004). The human 
as plural to which Arendt refers is “a catachrestic use of oneness”, accord-
ing to Judith Butler, who argues that for Arendt universalisation “seeks to 
establish inclusiveness for all human society, but one that posits no single 
defining principle for the humanity it assembles” (2011: 84). We are thus 
guided to understand plurality as a process and not as a boundary set by 
limits posed through inner differentiations (Butler, 2011: 84-5).
Similarly then, “woman” in this declaration assumed a catachrestic 
meaning aiming to unsettle inner differences in order to address such a 
unique interdependence traced within a plurality. As the activists declared, 
they oppose those advocating “if i exist, then you do not”. Coexisting in 
“woman” becomes signified, in Arendt’s words, as: “ignoring anyone di-
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rects him/her to be suspicious about his/her own existence”. Their reference 
to rights, liberties and peace may as well have sounded in a Kantian cos-
mopolitanism of universal hospitality, which then resonates to a Haberma-
sian public sphere of discursive democracy. However, they quote Arendt. 
indeed, there is strong link between Arendt and Kant in their perception of 
plurality as “a regulative ideal, that everyone has such rights, regardless of 
the cultural and linguistic differences by which anyone is characterised” 
(Butler, 2011: 85). But, for Butler, the important difference in the Arendtian 
pluralisation (as opposed to the Kantian universalisation) is the recognition 
that “political rights universalise, but always in the context of a differenti-
ate (and continually differentiating) population” (2011: 85-6). 
Although the humanity claimed in the name of ‘the human’ was ana-
lysed by Arendt in relation to stateless populations, refugees and migrants, 
for the female activists precariousness is re-signified in the name of woman 
and in relation to women’s position in a public sphere dominated by men. 
By claiming that the rights of Woman have been cast as Other to the rights 
of Man, they expose Woman as the Other of a hu/man citizen who has been 
granted citizenship rights. it is upon this claim that they build a precari-
ous political subjectivity which aims to expose modes of governance, by 
sustaining their vulnerable status as subjects deprived of rights. As they 
premise their demands upon the ungrounded right to have rights “as wom-
en”, they find a common way to exceed their inner differences by exposing 
‘woman’ in historicity and in a future promise of a different co-existence. 
Therefore, asking for political rights in the name of woman renders 
woman as a process ensured in the context of a differentiated and continu-
ally differentiating womanhood. However, as Jacques Rancière points out, 
“Man and citizen [or Woman] are political subjects and as such as are not 
definite collectivities, but surplus names that set out a question or a dispute 
(litige) about who is included in their count” (2010: 68, my emphasis). 
indeed, the surplus value carried in the name of woman, returned as a ques-
tion posed back to them while each had to account again for the process of 
their continuous differentiations. Soon after the creation of this platform, 
they had to rethink what it meant to sign “plurality” in the name of woman 
as they had to account anew for “differentiation”. 
3. “WOMAN” AS A SiGNATuRE OF DiSSENSuS 
Almost two years after this coalition was formed, on March 5 2010, the 
Turkish magazine KAOS GL published a series of letters exchanged between 
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Yasemin Öz (a human rights lawyer and LGBT rights activist) and Hidayet 
Şefkatli Tuksal (a religious activist, feminist and writer). The exchange had 
been occasioned by a signature campaign supporting the right of women to 
wear headscarves in the universities. Once again a great number of people, 
both as individuals and as organisations, signed this petition: KAOS GL, an 
LGBT organisation based in Ankara, was amongst them. This time, however, 
the fact that an LGBT organisation had signed a petition to support religious 
activist women did not appear to be a simple matter. Although the signature 
of KAOS GL initially appeared on the list, it soon disappeared. 
Without knowing the reasons why KAOS GL had removed their signa-
ture, Hidayet published an article, in which she expressed her gratitude to the 
feminist groups that might oppose religion and the use of the headscarf but 
nevertheless supported religious women’s fight against discrimination and 
injustice. in her letter, she also explains that she understands those who de-
cided to silently withdraw their endorsement without creating a problem and 
concluded: “We need to get mature together for a more democratic country.”
Yasemin, representing KAOS GL, responded immediately by circulat-
ing an e-mail to various web groups and to Hidayet personally, in order 
to explain that they had decided to withdraw their signature after learning 
that the religious activists had been subjected to severe pressure by con-
servative circles for their alliance with an LGBT organisation. in a long 
response, Yasemin explained, firstly, the affective atmosphere mediating 
the personal discussions between the two groups, which she defined as full 
of compassion and empathy. Secondly, she stated that the withdrawal of 
KAOS GL’s signature was a gesture of reinforcing their support as they felt 
obliged to respond to the pressure that their friends (as she called them) 
were subjected to, without however reducing the significance of both of 
their struggles. Finally, she recounted their positions as LGBT activists 
in relation to the use of the headscarf while emphasising that KAOS GL 
considered that a petition supporting the religious activists’ fight for their 
rights should not be turned into a platform to host discussions regarding 
the relation between homosexuality and religion. 
Actually, both Hidayet and Yasemin were members of the activist wom-
en’s platform Birbirimize Sahip Çıkıyoruz. After two years of almost daily 
negotiations over the limits of the support they could offer to each other, 
they had reached a position that would entail a paradoxical solidarity. As 
Hidayet mentioned in her letter, some feminist organisations signed the re-
ligious women’s petition, while their signature meant that they still opposed 
religion and veiling practices but supported the fight of religious women 
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against discrimination and oppression. if KAOS GL had not been forced to 
withdraw their endorsement, their signature would have also been signified 
similarly. This time, though, the pressure exercised by conservative circles 
on the female religious activists for accepting the signature of an LGBT or-
ganisation, exposed that even this kind of almost paradoxical support was 
to be hindered. it was almost impossible to make such a supportive act 
attain public visibility as a political statement made by women who have 
agreed to become allies while still keeping a distance between them. 
Comments made around this time by the Turkish state minister for 
Women and Family Affairs, Aliye Selma Kavaf, who declared gay people 
to be “sick” and homosexuality a biological disorder that requires treat-
ment, complicated even further the possibility of sustaining such a coali-
tion.6 While some female religious activists, as well as AK-DER, tried to 
take a distance from Kavaf’s comments, 21 different organisations wel-
comed these declarations and signed a press release in which they de-
nounced homosexuality as a threat and as corruption, as a perverse, im-
moral, sinful and unnatural act while identifying LGBT activists as part 
of a conspiratorial lobby scheming to embed homosexuality as a natu-
ral choice in the public consciousness. Among these was MAZLuM-DER 
(insan Hakları ve Mazlumlar İçin Dayanışma Derneği - Organisation for 
Human Rights and Solidarity for the Oppressed People), one of the first 
human rights organisations to relate rights’ violations to suffering and op-
pression (zulüm, zalim, mazlum as its name indicates).7 ironically, MA-
ZLuM-DER’s president, Ahmet Faruk Ünsal, while attempting to justify 
the aims ascribed to the name of this organisation and also to explain the 
decision to sign this petition, argued publicly that: “We deem homosexu-
ality abnormal, but we oppose any form of discrimination and violence 
against homosexual people”.8 
This comment resonated with the position taken by the female religious 
activists of AK-DER when they were asked to position themselves vis-à-vis 
homosexuality after the women’s alliance had been formed. As a member 
from AK-DER explained to me: 
6. Aliye Selma Kavaf’s interview in Hürriyet, March 7, 2010 (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/
pazar/ 14031207.asp?gid=59).
7. Radikal, March 22, 2010 (http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=Radikal Det
ayV3&ArticleiD=987114&Date=12.06.2010&CategoryiD=77).
8. Bianet, March 25, 2010 (http://bianet.org/bianet/toplumsal-cinsiyet/120894-mazlu 
mderde-insan-haklari-escinsel-deyince-bitiyor). 
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This platform opened the possibility to talk about issues that we had never 
discussed before, like as a Muslim, how do i see a homosexual, a feminist, 
or a Christian? We said that every identity has its Other, i mean, a found-
ing Other (kurucu öteki), so as Muslims our other is not a non-Muslim but 
zulüm (oppression, cruelty). All Muslims should be against zulüm, who-
ever enacts zulüm is our other. When someone is using violence against 
a homosexual, then, we are against this violence. This is our religious re-
sponsibility. 
She continued: 
According to islam, homosexuality is illicit (eşcinsellik haramdır), it is a 
sin (günah), it is neither abnormal nor a sickness.
The apparent difference between the two islamic organisations was that 
MAZLuM-DER signed a petition legitimising ‘hate crime’ in a period when 
the long fight for legal recognition of the LGBT organisation Lambda is-
tanbul was pending, and when murders of transsexual and gay people were 
being frequently reported on the news. Furthermore, amongst these signa-
tories were those who had exercised pressure on the female religious activ-
ists not to accept the support given by KAOS GL, leading the latter to with-
draw their endorsement and hence impeding almost two years of efforts to 
sustain the women’s activist platform. On the other hand, AK-DER’s stance 
regarding homosexuality could not satisfy the LGBT activists. 
The dialogues already taking place between the activists in street dem-
onstrations, in personal encounters, or over the listserv where they en-
gaged, daily, in an intensive exchange of opinions regarding their differ-
ences, had already made it clear that they needed to rethink what it means 
to sign “plurality” in the name of difference. This is why Yasemin writes 
in her letter: 
The endorsement [by KAOS GL] of the petition against the ban on the 
headscarf was an endorsement against unfairness and discrimination. in 
this sense the wearing of the headscarf by women is not something we ad-
vocate. When we stood side by side we did so with an awareness of our own 
frameworks, but united in our opposition to violence and discrimination.
Even if this alliance had its own limits, which were at times trans-
gressed or more entrenched, it was nevertheless commonly understood that 
the allies were not seeking to reach consensus on the conditions that have 
separately deprived them of certain citizenship rights. Their alliance was 
built on dissensus and not on consensus. As Rancière suggests, “a political 
subject is a capacity for staging scenes of dissensus” (2010: 69). in other 
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words, Rancière emphasises that the relation between bare life and politi-
cal life is never clear and that human rights mark the paradox of political 
life, since, as he mentions, “the rights of Man are the rights of those who 
have not the rights that they have and have the rights that they have not” 
(2010: 67). According to Rancière, then, this is the paradox upon which 
Arendt builds a lock (2010: 66). The process of making sense out of this 
paradox is not to agree, it is not to reach a consensus that becomes either a 
void (the rights of man are the rights of those who have no rights), or a tau-
tology (they are the rights of those who have rights) (2010: 67). For him, 
rights are inscriptions which textualise visibility and mobilise the right to 
dispute on who is included (2010: 69). Thus, “a dissensus is not a conflict 
of interests, opinions or values; it is a division inserted in ‘common sense’: 
a dispute over what is given, about the frame within which we see some-
thing as given” (ibid.). 
Even if the recognition of the religious and feminist and LGBT activists’ 
common suffering, of being commonly oppressed by the loss of the right to 
have rights, made them appear as unexpected allies, this recognition was a 
signature of political dissensus because its aim was to unsettle the common 
sense upon which the activists are positioned in opposition. Then the sur-
plus value that the name “woman” carried was negotiated between them in 
order to open the possibility of their ability to be in dialogue, intimacy, and 
affection. Hence, the differences between them were agonistic, rather than 
static, subsumed, or commensurable in the name of woman. They emerged 
as an aporetic question mediating how women’s precarity is framed in so-
ciety and how it becomes for them (between them) a claim of re-appropri-
ating a precarious subjectivity in order to inscribe their own disputes over 
rights, injuries and traumas. in other words, what they commonly signed 
was a claim to be considered as political subjects, especially when they 
have been expelled from their right to sign their own disputes over rights. 
This was made even more evident in the way that they then had decided to 
support each other in their oppositions. in this sense, the name of ‘woman’ 
was employed not only as a signature of resistance against the state, but, 
more importantly, as a metonymy to address the forms of liberal govern-
ance sustaining women’s oppression in society, and to claim the possibility 
of raising a different political voice vis-à-vis pre-established demarcations 
of racist, homophobic, sexist and nationalist political frontiers employed 
to frame gendered precariousness. Additionally, the paradoxical support 
that the allies decided to give each other would not have assumed the polit-
ical significance it was meant to carry, had the missing signature of KAOS 
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remained unnoticed. However, both religious and LGBT activists decided 
to make it public and hence to publicise the historicity of the impossible 
task in which they are ensnared, namely, to support each other in their dif-
ferences against discrimination and oppression. 
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